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Not released yet. SuperBench is an experimental single-host prototype under active development. Nothing is released or supported for use yet. These docs describe themain branch and will be refreshed at the first release.

Payload identity and the fixed helpers

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SuperBench’s daemon runs unprivileged. The few things that need root go through two small, fixed-policy helpers that take logical requests, never arbitrary paths, limits or commands. On a managed host the only sudo rule permits exactly these two executables.

bench-quota (installed as /usr/local/libexec/bench-quota) applies and retires XFS project quotas for benches, the shared store and the shared mirrors. It reads the root-owned policy /etc/superbench/storage.json; paths, byte and inode ceilings and worker ownership all come from that policy, never from the caller. It uses fixed absolute XFS tools and a fixed environment. A policy override (--policy) is accepted only from a direct root caller, never through sudo.

Its retirement authority is narrow: it removes only an empty logical bench directory, after XFS reports zero blocks and zero inodes for that allocation. It never deletes files recursively and is not a tree-deletion interface. See Quotas, mirrors and stores.

bench-payload (installed as /usr/local/libexec/bench-payload on managed hosts) is the boundary for running a task’s payload as a separate payload user. It is a dedicated helper, never a daemon:

  • It must be a static Linux executable (built with cgo off); the installer refuses one with a dynamic interpreter or shared-library dependency. On other platforms it refuses with unsupported.
  • It accepts no command-line arguments; sudo permits it only with the explicit empty argument string. It reads one bounded request frame from standard input.
  • It validates its fixed policy, the caller, the cgroup scope and the private payload layout, then drops credentials and executes. A credential drop may be irreversible, so on any error it exits rather than retrying or restoring privileges, and it prints only a closed refusal code.
  • The payload’s environment is rebuilt, not inherited: a fixed PATH, HOME and TMPDIR from the validated private payload layout, git’s global and system configuration turned off, and only a small allowlist of locale and CI variables. Daemon credentials, loader hooks, shell startup programs and sudo metadata do not pass through.

This is the caveat that travels with the payload identity: main installs the trusted service-account execution model; it does not yet install and activate the complete separate payload-user path. The helper, the private payload policy and service registry it requires, the fresh registered layout, and the routing of run, setup and git through it must all land and be verified together before that boundary can be claimed. The packaging checks alone do not prove payload isolation.

Until then, supervised commands run with the launching account’s authority, inside a fenced cgroup. That is the boundary described in Supervised runs and setup and the Security model: lifecycle fencing for trusted commands, with no uid, mount or network isolation per bench.