Security model
SuperBench coordinates trusted callers working on trusted repositories on one host. It is not a sandbox, and the code does not isolate untrusted code beyond what this page says. Read this before anything else on the site.
The assumptions
Section titled “The assumptions”- Trusted repositories. Repository setup hooks are shell code, run as the service user. Local git configuration and hooks apply. Only trusted repositories are suitable.
- Cooperative callers. A lease stops other
benchacquisitions. It does not stop direct edits, an arbitrary shell, or another process running as the same user. - One host. State, leases and checkpoints are local. There is no network lease coordination.
- Trusted operators. An operator on the local API is trusted to run arbitrary commands as the daemon’s user.
The accounts
Section titled “The accounts”| Account | Owns or does | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| root | Installed binaries and configuration, the storage policy /etc/superbench/storage.json, the privileged quota ledger, and the parents of managed data |
The staged unit runs benchd as the unprivileged superbench account; benchd itself does not refuse root (its default --operator-uids includes 0). Reap refuses root. |
The daemon account (superbench in the staged installer) |
Private state (mode 0700) and runtime, the bench, cache and mirror directories it is assigned | A stable account, so lease and recovery ownership survive restarts. This is a trusted coding-agent account, not tenant isolation. |
| The payload user | A separate identity for running a task’s payload, entered through the fixed payload helper | Present in source. main does not install and activate the complete separate payload-user path, so payloads today run with the launching account’s authority. |
Managed hosts get one sudo rule, /etc/sudoers.d/superbench. It permits only the fixed quota
helper, which takes its logical allocation arguments and refuses --policy from sudo callers, and
the dedicated payload helper, pinned to no command-line arguments. There is no generic shell or XFS
sudo, and a sudo caller cannot select another policy. See
Payload identity and the fixed helpers.
What is enforced
Section titled “What is enforced”- Socket authorization by kernel peer credentials.
benchdreads the connecting process’s uid from the kernel (SO_PEERCREDon Linux,LOCAL_PEERCREDon macOS). Identity headers cannot grant authority. Operators can mutate; readers can only querystatusandhost_status. The socket is mode 0660 and its parent must not be group- or world-writable. - No TCP listener. The only listener in the non-test source is a Unix socket. This is read from the source; no test asserts the absence of a TCP socket, so it holds only as long as the code does.
- Lease tokens are holder capabilities. A token is returned only on acquisition, on an
administrative stop (
stop --admin) or on exact replay of a completed request’s receipt. Status and checkpoint output redact it, and supervised commands do not receive it in their environment. - Checkpoints never rewrite history. A checkpoint pushes the existing HEAD without force and confirms the remote has exactly that commit. Nothing in that path makes a commit.
- Process-tree fencing on Linux. A supervised run is born inside its own delegated cgroup-v2
scope, and stop kills the whole scope (
cgroup.kill), including detachedsetsiddescendants, before checkpoint or release. - Byte and inode caps on managed Linux XFS hosts, through a fixed-policy root helper that accepts logical allocations only.
- Archived trees are read-only to ordinary writes, and deletion needs an exact reviewed manifest after a grace period.
What is not enforced
Section titled “What is not enforced”- No uid, mount or network isolation per bench. Neither cooperative nor supervised mode provides it. A supervised command has the launching user’s authority, so a deliberate cgroup escape by that user is outside the boundary. The repository calls this lifecycle fencing for trusted commands, not a sandbox.
- Direct local commands bypass the socket’s uid policy. A
benchcommand run without--socketon the daemon’s state does not go through the socket’s operator and reader checks. It is bounded only by the state directory being 0700 and owned by the daemon account. - Cooperative leases do not fence anything. A shell or editor opened after
bench leaseis outside SuperBench’s control. Onlyrunandsetupcreate supervised scopes. - No automatic lease expiry. A crashed holder keeps its lease until someone inspects it.
- The archive permission boundary is cooperative. The trusted owner can
chmodan archived tree and root can bypass mode bits. Already-open writable handles are not revoked. - Cross-host handoff files are unsigned. Their digests bind bytes, not machines or operators.
- Git and network calls can block without an application deadline, and no timeout proves a writer stopped.
- The managed sudo path is retained on purpose. Adding
NoNewPrivilegesor a capability filter would break the helpers; do not treat the service unit as a hardened sandbox.
Secrets
Section titled “Secrets”Treat saved state and acquisition output as private: they hold lease tokens. Prefer the
BENCH_LEASE_TOKEN environment variable to --token, which exposes the token in process
arguments. Repository credentials belong in the service account’s own credential mechanism, never
in a repository, a tracked environment file or a prompt.